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What	   it	   takes	   to	  understand	   radically	  different	  others	   lies	  at	   the	  heart	  of	   the	  philosophies	  
developed	   by	  Collingwood	   and	  Wittgenstein	   at	   roughly	   the	   same	   time. i	  Their	   approaches	  
contain	  three	  differences	  that	  are	  prima	  facie	  significant,	  but	  ultimately	  prove	  to	  be	  little	  more	  
than	  a	  divergence	  in	  emphasis.	  This	  is	  particularly	  remarkable	  in	  light	  of	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  two	  
thinkers	  are	   frequently	   thought	  to	  stand	  at	  opposite	  ends	  of	   the	  methodological	  spectrum	  
with	  respect	  to	  the	  value	  of	  metaphysics.	  
	   First,	   there	   is	   the	   difference	   between	   period	   and	   place.	   Whereas	   Wittgenstein	  
typically	  considers	  examples	  of	  (chiefly	  fictional)	  people	  from	  geographically	  distant	  strange	  
lands,	  Collingwood	  concentrates	  specifically	  on	  the	  thought	  and	  action	  of	  past	  figures	  from	  
the	  history	  of	  Western	  civilization.	  This	  relates	  to	  the	  second	  difference	  between	  them,	  which	  
is	   that	   Wittgenstein	   focuses	   on	   collectives	   of	   people	   whereas	   Collingwood	   is	   primarily	  
interested	  in	  individuals.	  The	  third,	  arguably	  largest	  difference,	  is	  in	  their	  conceptions	  of	  what	  
understanding	   involves.	   For	   Collingwood,	   this	   is	   a	   matter	   of	   re-­‐enacting	   the	   practical	  
reasoning	  of	  those	  concerned;	  Wittgenstein,	  by	  contrast,	  seems	  to	  think	  it	  requires	  a	  serious	  
immersion	  in	  the	  other’s	  form	  of	  life,	  a	  feat	  more	  (on	  some	  views	  only)	  feasible	  with	  one’s	  own	  
contemporaries.	  	  
	   We	   must	   nonetheless	   view	   their	   approaches	   to	   understanding	   others	   as	  
complementary,	  rather	  than	  opposed.	  For	  one,	  it	  is	  plausible	  to	  expect	  that	  the	  conditions	  for	  
understanding	   the	   foreign	   present	   should	   parallel	   those	   for	   the	   local	   past	   of	   historical	  
understanding.	  As	  the	  famous	  opening	  line	  of	  L.P.	  Hartley’s	  The	  Go-­‐Between	  contends,	  ‘the	  
past	  is	  another	  country,	  they	  do	  things	  differently	  there’	  (1953:1).	  We	  must	  also	  take	  care	  to	  
not	   exaggerate	   the	   differences	   in	   their	   interest.	   Wittgenstein	   does	   not	   solely	   focus	   on	  
understanding	   one’s	   contemporaries,	   and	   Collingwood	  was	   certainly	   interested	   in	   cultural	  
beliefs	   and	   practices,	   as	   exemplified	   in	   his	   works	   of	   history,	   the	   doctrine	   of	   absolute	  
presuppositions	   (arguably	   inspired	   by	   Evans-­‐Pritchard ii 	  but	   connected	   to	   the	   'hinge	  
propositions'	  of	  Wittgenstein's	  On	  Certaintyiii),	  and	  his	  critique	  of	  anthropology.iv	  Pari	  passu,	  
not	   all	   of	   Collingwood's	   pronouncements	   are	   about	   individuals	   and,	   as	   we	   shall	   see,	  
Wittgenstein's	   more	   personal	   worries	   about	   understanding	   others	   focus	   explicitly	   on	   the	  
thought	  of	  individuals.	  	  
	   While	  Wittgenstein	  does	  not	  adhere	  to	  anything	  resembling	  Collingwood’s	  method	  of	  
re-­‐enactment,	  there	  are	  deep	  commonalities	  in	  how	  they	  conceive	  of	  the	  relation	  between	  
though,	  action,	  and	  explanation.	  Both	  philosophers	  resist	  the	  temptation	  to	  assume	  that	  the	  
thoughts	  of	  others	  are	   inner	  mental	  events	  which	  are	   in	  principle	  hidden	   from	  us.	  Rather,	  
actions	   are	   the	   observable	   expressions	   of	   our	   thoughts	   and	   desires	   and	   it	   is	   in	   principle	  
possible	   for	   one	   person	   to	   have	   the	   very	   same	   thoughts	   as	   another.	   However	   large	   the	  
psychological	  or	  cultural	  obstacles	  to	  this	  might	  be	  they	  are	  ultimately	  contingent	  in	  nature.	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The	  task	  of	  both	  the	  historian	  and	  the	  anthropologist,	  so	  conceived,	  is	  not	  to	  establish	  
facts	  and	  offer	  causal	  explanations	  for	  them,	  but	  to	  explore	  what	  a	  situation	  means	  or	  meant	  
to	  those	  whom	  one	  is	  trying	  to	  understand.	  As	  Peter	  Winch	  would	   later	  put	   it,	   'the	  way	  to	  
understand	  events	  in	  human	  history	  ['…]	  is	  more	  closely	  analogous	  to	  the	  way	  in	  which	  we	  
understand	   expressions	   of	   ideas	   than	   it	   is	   to	   the	   way	   we	   understand	   physical	   processes.	  
(Winch	   1958:	   123-­‐4).vIn	   this	  methodological	   approach,	  Collingwood	   and	  Wittgenstein	   are	  
close	  as	  two	  coats	  of	  paint.	  	  
	  
	  




According	   to	   Collingwood,	   the	   explanation	   of	   past	  action	   requires	   a	   reconstruction	   of	   the	  
thought	   and	   reasoning	   that	   led	   up	   to	   it.	   Without	   this	   our	   knowledge	   is	   limited	   to	   the	  
occurrence	   of	   bodily	   events	   and,	   as	   such,	   lacks	   understanding.	   Since	   the	   re-­‐enactment	  
involved	  inevitably	  occurs	  from	  a	  different	  perspective	  it	  takes	  on	  a	  critical	  form:	  
	  
	  
The	  history	  of	  thought,	  and	  therefore	  all	  history,	  is	  the	  re-­‐enactment	  of	  past	  thought	  
in	   the	  historian’s	  own	  mind.	  This	   re-­‐enactment	   is	  only	  accomplished,	   in	   the	  case	  of	  
Plato	  and	  Caesar	  respectively,	  so	  far	  as	  the	  historian	  brings	  to	  bear	  on	  the	  problem	  all	  
the	  powers	  of	  his	  own	  mind	  and	  all	  his	  knowledge	  of	  philosophy	  and	  politics.	  It	  is	  not	  
a	  passive	  surrender	  to	  the	  spell	  of	  another’s	  mind;	  it	  is	  a	  labour	  of	  active	  and	  therefore	  
critical	  thinking.	  The	  historian	  not	  only	  re-­‐enacts	  past	  thought,	  he	  re-­‐enacts	  it	  in	  the	  
context	  of	  his	  own	  knowledge	  and	  therefore,	  in	  re-­‐enacting	  it,	  criticizes	  it,	  forms	  his	  
own	  judgment	  of	  its	  value,	  corrects	  whatever	  errors	  he	  can	  discern	  in	  it.	  This	  criticism...	  
is	  an	  indispensable	  condition	  of	  the	  historical	  knowledge	  itself...	  the	  thought	  which	  re-­‐
enacts	  past	  thoughts	  .	  .	  .	  criticizes	  them	  in	  re-­‐enacting	  them.vi	  
	  
	  
The	  clue	  to	  what	  re-­‐enactment	  itself	  consists	  in	  is	  provided	  some	  pages	  later:	  
	  
	  
Suppose,	  for	  example,	  [the	  historian]	  is	  reading	  the	  Theodosian	  Code,	  and	  has	  before	  
him	   a	   certain	   edict	   of	   an	   emperor.	   Merely	   reading	   the	   words	   and	   being	   able	   to	  
translate	  them	  does	  not	  amount	  to	  knowing	  their	  historical	  significance.	  In	  order	  to	  do	  
that	  he	  must	  envisage	  it	  as	  that	  emperor	  envisaged	  it.	  Then	  he	  must	  see	  for	  himself,	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just	  as	  if	  the	  emperor’s	  situation	  were	  his	  own,	  how	  such	  a	  situation	  might	  be	  dealt	  
with;	  he	  must	  choose	  to	  see	  the	  possible	  alternative,	  and	  the	  reasons	  for	  choosing	  one	  
rather	  than	  another;	  and	  thus	  he	  must	  go	  through	  the	  process	  which	  the	  emperor	  went	  
through	  in	  deciding	  on	  this	  particular	  course.	  Thus	  he	  is	  re-­‐enacting	  in	  his	  own	  mind	  
the	  experience	  of	  the	  emperor;	  and	  only	  in	  so	  far	  as	  he	  does	  this	  has	  he	  any	  historical	  
knowledge,	  as	  distinct	  from	  a	  merely	  philological	  knowledge,	  of	  the	  meaning	  of	  the	  
edict.vii	  
	  
Without	  such	  re-­‐enactment,	  we	  can	  at	  best	  only	  chronicle	  events.	  But	  the	  missing	  element	  is	  
not	  a	  discrete	  thought	  or	  intention	  that	  hides	  behind	  an	  otherwise	  clear	  meaning.	  In	  the	  case	  
of	  a	  philosophical	  text,	  for	  instance,	  its	  meaning	  can	  only	  be	  understood	  once	  one	  has	  seen	  
‘what	  the	  philosophical	  problem	  was,	  of	  which	  his	  author	  is	  here	  stating	  his	  solution	  […]re-­‐
thinking	  for	  himself	  the	  thought	  of	  the	  author’.viii	  To	  achieve	  this,	  we	  must	  ‘come	  pre-­‐	  pared	  
with	  an	  experience	  sufficiently	  like	  his	  own	  to	  make	  those	  thoughts	  organic	  to	  it’.ix	  
In	  what	  sense	  are	  we	  supposed	  to	  go	  through	  the	  same	  process	  of	   thought	  as	   the	  
person	  we	   are	   trying	   to	   understand?	   Collingwood's	   readers	   today	  must	   themselves	   adopt	  
strategies	  of	  re-­‐enactment	  in	  order	  to	  find	  out	  what	  Collingwood	  actually	  meant	  by	  it.	  As	  we	  
cannot	  make	  sense	  of	  what	   it	  would	  be	  to	  to	  go	  through	  the	  same	  particular	  process,	   it	   is	  
tempting	  to	  assume	  that	  Collingwood	  has	  in	  mind	  a	  thought	  process	  of	  the	  same	  type.	  Nothing	  
could	  be	  further	  from	  the	  truth:	  
	  
	  
When	  I	  read	  Plato’s	  argument	   in	  the	  Theaetetus	  against	  the	  view	  that	  knowledge	  is	  
merely	  sensation,	  I	  do	  not	  know	  what	  philosophical	  doctrines	  he	  was	  attacking;	  I	  could	  
not	   expound	   these	  doctrines	   and	   say	   in	   detail	   who	  maintained	   them	   and	   by	  what	  
arguments.	  In	  its	  immediacy,	  as	  an	  actual	  experience	  of	  its	  own,	  Plato’s	  argument	  must	  
undoubtedly	  have	  grown	  up	  out	  of	  a	  discussion	  of	  some	  sort,	  though	  I	  do	  not	  know	  
what	  it	  was,	  and	  been	  closely	  connected	  with	  such	  a	  discussion.	  Yet	  if	  I	  not	  only	  read	  
his	  argument	  but	  understand	  it,	  follow	  it	  in	  my	  own	  mind	  by	  re-­‐arguing	  it	  with	  and	  for	  
myself,	  the	  process	  of	  argument	  which	  I	  go	  through	  is	  not	  a	  process	  resembling	  Plato’s,	  
it	  actually	  is	  Plato’s	  so	  far	  as	  I	  understand	  him	  correctly.x	  
	  
	  
The	  rethinking	  of	  a	  thought,	  then,	  is	  identical	  to	  its	  critical	  consideration.	  So	  understood,	  the	  
practice	  shares	  elements	  with	  the	  Pyrrhonic	  method	  of	  holding	  a	  belief	  without	  assenting	  to	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it.	  	  	  Collingwood	  is	  here	  explicitly	  rejecting	  the	  (still)	  dominant	  view	  that	  identity,	  as	  opposed	  
to	   mere	   resemblance,	   is	   either	   a	   matter	   of	   strict	   numerical	   (token/token)	   identity,	   or	   an	  
instantiation	   of	   a	   universal	   type	   in	   a	   token	   copy.xi	  Instead,	   he	  maintains	   that	   one	  may	   go	  
through	  the	  very	  same	  thought	  process	  as	  Plato	  just	  by	  reasoning	  in	  exactly	  the	  same	  way	  as	  
he	  did.	  A	  thought	  process,	  after	  all,	  is	  but	  a	  reasoning	  process	  and	  we	  cannot	  rule	  out	  that	  two	  
people	  at	  different	  times	  and	  places	  might,	  in	  principle,	  reason	  in	  exactly	  the	  same	  way.	  How	  
might	  such	  sameness	  be	  ruled	  in?	  We	  find	  a	  ready-­‐made	  example	  in	  Jorge	  Luis	  Borges'	  story	  
about	  Pierre	  Menard,	  who	  initially	  sets	  out	  to	  write	  the	  Don	  Quixote	  from	  scratch,	  initially	  by	  
being	  Miguel	  de	  Cervantes	  (learning	  Spanish,	  returning	  to	  Catholicism,	  forgetting	  the	  history	  
of	   Europe	   from	   1602	   to	   1918,	   etc.)	   but	   finally	   coming	   to	   write	   the	   9th	   and	   thirty-­‐eighth	  
chapters	  of	  Part	  I	  and	  a	  fragment	  of	  Chapter	  twenty-­‐two	  through	  his	  own	  experiences.xii	  




[Thought]	   is	   both	   immediacy	   and	   mediation.	   Every	   act	   of	   thought,	   as	   it	   actually	  
happens,	  happens	  in	  a	  context	  out	  of	  which	  it	  arises	  and	  in	  which	  it	  lives,	  like	  any	  other	  
experience,	  as	  an	  organic	  part	  of	  the	  thinker’s	  life	  .	  .	  .	  in	  addition	  to	  actually	  happening	  
it	   is	   capable	   of	   sustaining	   itself	   and	   being	   revived	   or	   repeated	   without	   loss	   of	   its	  
identity...	  what	  we	  think	  is	  not	  altered	  by	  alterations	  of	  the	  context	  in	  which	  we	  think	  
it	   […]	   in	   their	   immediacy,	  as	  actual	  experiences	  organically	  united	  with	   the	  body	  of	  
experience	  out	  of	  which	  they	  arise,	  Plato’s	  thought	  and	  mine	  are	  different.	  But	  in	  their	  
mediation	  they	  are	  the	  same.xiii	  
	  
Collingwood's	   thought	   that	   two	   people	   can	   have	   the	   very	   same	   thought	   it	   itself	   shared	   by	  
Wittgenstein.	   But	   Wittgenstein's	   remarks	   on	   this	   are	   unconcerned	   with	   overcoming	   any	  
pragmatic	  difficulties	  which	  might	  be	  presented	  by	  period	  or	  place,	  seeking	  instead	  to	  establish	  
a	  logical	  possibility	  in	  the	  philosophy	  of	  mind.	  This	  is	  not	  because	  Wittgenstein	  has	  no	  interest	  
in	  the	  first	  set	  of	  worries.	  It	  is	  just	  that	  we	  must	  look	  elsewhere	  in	  his	  work	  to	  find	  them,	  in	  what	  
we	  might	  call	  his	  philosophy	  of	  understanding.	  As	  we	  shall	  eventually	  see,	  however,	   the	  two	  
areas	  of	  enquiry	  are	  not	  unconnected.	  Wittgenstein's	  philosophy	  of	  mind	  both	  completes	  and	  is	  
completed	  by	  his	  philosophy	  of	  understanding.	  In	  order	  to	  appreciate	  how	  this	  completion	  itself	  
completes	  the	  thought	  of	  Collingwood	  we	  must	  first	  take	  a	  brief	  excursion	  into	  the	  relation	  of	  
thought	  to	  action.	  
	  
	  
II.   From	  Thought	  to	  Action	  
	  
	  
Wittgenstein	  notoriously	  rebukes	  the	  commonsense	  assumption	  that	  two	  people	  cannot	  have	  
the	  same	  pain:	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“Another	   person	   cannot	   have	   my	   pains.”	   –	   Which	   are	  my	   pains?	   What	   counts	   as	  
criterion	   of	   identity	   here?	   Consider	   what	  makes	   it	   possible	   in	   the	   case	   of	   physical	  
objects	  to	  speak	  of	  “two	  exactly	  the	  same”,	  for	  example,	  to	  say	  “This	  chair	  is	  not	  the	  
one	  you	  saw	  here	  yesterday,	  but	  is	  exactly	  the	  same	  as	  it”:	  In	  so	  far	  as	  it	  makes	  sense	  
to	  say	  that	  my	  pain	  is	  the	  same	  as	  his,	  it	  is	  also	  possible	  for	  both	  of	  us	  to	  have	  the	  same	  
pain:	  “But	  surely	  another	  person	  can’t	  have	  THIS	  pain”	  –	  the	  answer	  to	  this	  is	  that	  one	  
does	  not	  define	  a	  criterion	  of	  identity	  by	  emphatic	  stressing	  of	  the	  word	  “this”.	  Rather,	  
what	  the	  emphasis	  does	  is	  to	  suggest	  the	  case	  in	  which	  we	  are	  conversant	  with	  such	  a	  
criterion	  of	  identity,	  but	  have	  to	  be	  reminded	  if	  it.	  The	  substitution	  of	  “identical”	  for	  
“the	  same”	  (for	  instance)	  is	  another	  typical	  expedient	  in	  philosophy.xiv	  
	  
The	  view	  here	  is	  that	  we	  are	  being	  presented	  with	  two	  different	  language	  games,	  neither	  of	  
which	   is	   in	   itself	   justified	   or	   unjustified,	   correct	   or	   incorrect,	   though	   their	   comparative	  
proximities	  to	  everyday	  parlance	  are	  instructive.	  It	  is	  all-­‐too-­‐easy	  to	  become	  so	  fixated	  by	  a	  
philosophical	   or	   scientific	   picture	   that	   we	   fail	   to	   recognise	   that	   there	   are	   other,	   equally	  
legitimate,	  ways	  of	  seeing	  the	  same	  thing.	  A	  related	  danger	  is	  that	  of	  switching	  between	  two	  




The	   reasoning	   is	   confused,	   for	   two	  different	   language-­‐games	  are	  being	  crossed	   .	   .	   .	  
‘pain	  in	  my	  leg’	  does	  not	  determine	  a	  location	  in	  the	  same	  way	  as	  ‘penny	  in	  my	  pocket	  
does’.	  Hence	  we	  should	  be	  suspicious	  of	  the	  claim	  that	  since	  A’s	  pain	  is	  in	  his	  foot	  and	  
B’s	  pain	  is	  in	  his	  foot,	  therefore	  their	  pains	  are	  in	  different	  places.xv	  
	  
As	  David	  Boucher,	  Wendy	  James,	  and	  Philip	  Smallwood	  demonstrate,	  Collingwood's	  undated	  
paper	   'Observations	  of	  Language)	   isolates	   'the	   identity	  of	   language	  in	  near-­‐Wittgensteinian	  
terms'	  (Collingwood:	  2005	  xvii	  &	  18,	  n.1).	  Collingwood	  here	  writes:	  
	  
	  
It	  is	  a	  mistake	  to	  think	  of	  it	  as	  having	  certain	  properties	  or	  powers	  in	  itself	  and	  
apart	  from	  the	  ‘using’	  of	  it:	  for	  since	  it	  is	  an	  activity,	  not	  an	  instrument,	  it	  does	  not	  
exist	  save	  in	  being	  ‘used’.xvi	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Boucher	  et.al	  note	  that	  while	  there	  is	  no	  evidence	  that	  Collingwood	  knew	  of	  Wittgenstein's	  
ideas	  (and	  so	  may	  have	  formulated	  his	  own	  views	  of	  language	  independently)	  we	  find	  
additional	  parallels	  in	  The	  Principles	  of	  Art	  and	  The	  New	  Leviathan:	  
	  
One	  does	  not	  first	  acquire	  a	  language	  and	  then	  use	  it.	  To	  possess	  it	  and	  to	  use	  it	  are	  
the	  same.	  We	  only	  come	  to	  possess	  it	  by	  repeatedly	  and	  progressively	  attempting	  
to	  use	  it.’xvii	  	  
	  A	  word	  is	  not	  a	  sound	  or	  group	  of	  sounds	  .	  .	  .	  ;	  it	  is	  a	  sound	  or	  group	  of	  sounds	  
having	  its	  own	  meaning,	  namely	  what	  a	  person	  using	  that	  word	  means	  by	  making	  
that	  sound.xviii	  	  
	  
Unlike	  Wittgenstein,	  however,	  he	  would	  not	  have	  had	  any	  problem	  with	  the	  claim	  'you	  cannot	  
have	  my	   pain'	  per	   se.	   This	   is	   because	  pain,	   for	  Collingwood,	   is	   a	   sensation,	   and	   therefore	  
strikingly	  different	  from	  thinking	  in	  not	  being	  a	  'directional	  activity'.xix	  Accordingly,	  the	  spatio-­‐
temporal	  criteria	  that	  apply	  to	  the	  having	  of	  the	  sensation	  do	  not	  apply	  to	  what	  Collingwood	  
means	  by	  'thought'	  viz.	  what	  is	  thought	  rather	  than	  the	  thinking	  of	  it.xx	  
We	  are	  now	  in	  a	  better	  position	  to	  explore	  how	  re-­‐thinking	  past	  thoughts	  is	  meant	  to	  
help	  with	  the	  understanding	  of	  historical	  figures	  and,	  mutatis	  mutandis,	  with	  the	  explanation	  
of	  their	  actions.	  As	  already	  noted,	  Collingwood	  maintains	  that	  without	  the	  reconstruction	  of	  
the	   reasoning	   that	   led	   up	   to	   action,	   the	   historian’s	   knowledge	   is	   limited	   to	   that	   of	   the	  
occurrence	   of	   bodily	   events.	   Without	   re-­‐enactment,	   we	   can	   only	   capture	   a	   record	   of	  
statements	  which	  chronicle	  events:	  
	  
The	  processes	  of	  nature	  can...	  be	  properly	  described	  as	  sequences	  of	  mere	  events,	  but	  
those	   of	   history	   cannot.	   They	   are	   not	   processes	   of	   mere	   events	   but	   processes	   of	  
actions,	  which	  have	  an	   inner	  side,	  consisting	  of	  processes	  of	  thought;	  and	  what	  the	  




Thoughts,	  for	  Collingwood,	  are	  but	  aspects	  of	  the	  actions	  which	  can	  be	  used	  to	  characterise	  
them.	   Accordingly,	   there	   are	   no	   hidden	   'inner'	   thoughts	   which	   lie	   behind	   –	   and	   causally	  
precede	  –	  actions:	  
	  
	  
The	  historian,	  investigating	  any	  event	  in	  the	  past,	  makes	  a	  distinction	  between	  what	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may	  be	  called	  the	  outside	  and	  the	  inside	  of	  an	  event	  .	  .	   .	  By	  the	   inside	  of	  an	  event	  I	  
mean	  that	  in	  it	  which	  can	  only	  be	  described	  in	  terms	  of	  thought:	  Caesar’s	  defiance	  of	  
Republican	  law,	  or	  the	  clash	  of	  constitutional	  policy	  between	  himself	  and	  his	  assassins	  
.	  .	  .	  an	  action	  is	  the	  unity	  of	  the	  outside	  and	  inside	  of	  an	  event...	  [the	  historian’s]	  main	  
task	  is	  to	  think	  himself	  into	  this	  action,	  to	  discern	  the	  thought	  of	  its	  agent...	  For	  history,	  
the	  object	  to	  be	  discovered	  is	  not	  the	  mere	  event,	  but	  the	  thought	  expressed	  in	  it.	  To	  
discover	  that	  thought	  is	  already	  to	  understand	  it.	  After	  the	  historian	  has	  ascertained	  
the	  facts,	   there	   is	  no	  further	  process	  of	   inquiring	   into	  their	  causes.	  When	  he	  knows	  
what	  happened,	  he	  already	  knows	  why	  it	  happened.xxii	  
	  
	  
While	   Collingwood	   couches	   his	   position	   in	   Hegelian	   terminology, xxiii 	  there	   is	   an	   obvious	  
parallel	  here	  with	  Wittgenstein's	  contention	  that	  nothing	   is	  hidden	  (PI	  §§243-­‐316).	  William	  
Dray	   captures	   this	   aspect	   of	   Collingwood’s	   philosophy	   of	   mind	   &	   action	   very	   well	   by	  
comparing	  his	  philosophy	  of	  mind	  to	  that	  of	  Ryle:	  
	  
	  
[F]ar	   from	   considering	   explanatory	   thoughts	   as	   unobservable	   events,	   he	   regarded	  
them	  as	  having	  no	  existence	  at	  all	  apart	  from	  the	  events	  which	  expressed	  them.	  In	  this	  
connection,	   his	   views	   are	   much	   closer	   to	   those	   of	   his	   successor	   in	   the	   Chair	   of	  
Metaphysical	   Philosophy	   of	   Oxford,	   Gilbert	   Ryle,	   than	   has	   always	   been	   supposed.	  
Suggestive	  in	  this	  connection	  is	  his	  vigorous	  attack	  on	  what	  he	  called	  ‘the	  metaphysical	  
theory	   of	   mind’	   –	   the	   conception	   of	   it	   as	   a	   non-­‐physical	   substance,	   rather	   than	   a	  
complex	  of	  activities.xxiv	  
	  
If	  action	  is	  ontologically	  inseparable	  from	  thought	  then	  one	  cannot	  even	  begin	  to	  understand	  
explain	  action	  without	  understanding	  the	  thoughts	  which	  form	  part	  of	  its	  constitution.	  Given	  
this	   tight	   connection,	   the	   question	   of	   whether	   beliefs	   and	   ‘pro-­‐attitudes’	   are	   causes	   of	  
intentional	   behaviour	   does	   not	   even	   arise.	   This	   is	   because	   it	   makes	   no	   sense	   to	   look	   for	  
nomological	  relations	  between	  the	  inner	  and	  outer	  aspects	  of	  one	  and	  the	  same	  event.	  One	  
may,	  of	  course,	  observe	  correlations	  between	  various	  inner	  and	  outer	  characterisations,	  but	  
the	  latter	  are	  not	  what	  the	  historian	  is	  trying	  to	  explain,	  for	  the	  job	  of	  the	  historian	  is	  to	  explain	  
action	   –	   and	   thereby	   also	   thought	   –	   not	   mere	   movements	   of	   material	   bodies.	   A	   unified	  
account	  of	  neuroscientific	  explanations	  of	  every	  single	  bodily	  movement	  of	  some	  person	  does	  
not	  constitute	  a	  biography.	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Actions,	   for	   Collingwood,	   are	   not	   identified	   through	   –	   let	   alone	   with	   –	   bodily	  
movements,	  but	  by	  the	  thought(s)	  which	  they	  express.	  When	  he	  speaks	  of	  actions	  having	  an	  
interior	   aspect	   that	   events	   lack,	   this	   is	   arguably	   a	   metaphorical	   way	   of	   expressing	   the	  
Aristotelian	  point	  that	  in	  attempting	  to	  understand	  any	  given	  action	  we	  may	  ascribe	  a	  practical	  
syllogism	  to	  its	  agent.	  Such	  syllogisms	  are	  reconstructed	  reasonings	  which	  help	  to	  explain	  the	  
agent’s	  action	  by	  disclosing	  what	  she	  was	  doing.	  They	  need	  not	  either	  accompany	  or	  precede	  
the	   act,	  which	   they	   are	   not	   entirely	   separate	   from.	  Hence	   Collingwood’s	   claim	   that	  when	  
historians	  know	  what	  happened	  they	  already	  know	  why	  it	  happened	  (‘for	  the	  historian	  there	  
is	  no	  difference	  between	  discovering	  what	  happened	  and	  discovering	  why	  it	  happened’).	  
A	  related	  thought	  would	  later	  be	  echoed	  by	  Wittgenstein's	  pupil	  G.	  E.	  M.	  Anscombe	  
in	  her	  account	  of	  explanation	  by	  re-­‐description:	  
	  
	  
The	  description	  of	  something	  as	  a	  human	  action	  could	  not	  occur	  prior	  to	  the	  existence	  
of	  the	  question	  ‘Why?’,	  simply	  as	  a	  kind	  of	  utterance	  by	  which	  we	  were	  then	  obscurely	  
prompted	  to	  address	  the	  question.xxv	  
	  
Whether	  or	  not	  Collingwood	  had	  recognised	  that	  explanation	  is	  sensitive	  to	  description,	  what	  
is	   clear	   is	   that,	   despite	   his	   reference	   to	   the	   'inner',	  he	   joins	  Wittgenstein	   and	   anticipates	  
Anscombe	  in	  taking	  his	  point	  about	  action	  being	  the	  outer	  expression	  of	  thought	  to	  debunk	  a	  




This	  does	  not	  mean	  that	  words	  like	  ‘cause’	  are	  necessarily	  out	  of	  place	  in	  reference	  to	  
history;	  it	  only	  means	  that	  they	  are	  used	  there	  in	  a	  special	  sense.	  When	  a	  scientist	  asks	  
‘Why	  did	  that	  piece	  of	  litmus	  paper	  turn	  pink?’	  he	  means	  ‘On	  what	  kinds	  of	  occasions	  
do	  pieces	  of	   litmus	  paper	   turn	  pink?’	  When	  an	  historian	  asks	   ‘Why	  did	  Brutus	   stab	  
Caesar?’	  he	  means	  ‘What	  did	  Brutus	  think,	  which	  made	  him	  decide	  to	  stab	  Caesar?’	  
The	  cause	  of	  the	  event,	  for	  him,	  means	  the	  thought	  in	  the	  mind	  of	  the	  person	  by	  whose	  
agency	  the	  event	  came	  about:	  and	  this	  is	  not	  something	  other	  than	  the	  event,	  it	  is	  the	  
inside	  of	  the	  event	  itself.xxvii	  	  
	  
	  
Collingwood’s	  methodological	  approach	  here	  is	  once	  again	  eerily	  close	  to	  that	  of	  Wittgenstein,	  
as	   described	   above.xxviii	  With	   this	   in	  mind,	   let	  me	   now	   outline	  Wittgenstein's	   approach	   to	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III.   Sharing	  Lives	  
	  
	  
Whereas	  Wittgenstein’s	  published	  writings	  on	   forms	  of	   life	   refer	   to	  entire	   communities	  of	  
people,	   his	   personal	   obsession	   with	   the	   difficulty	   of	   understanding	   others	   focuses	   on	  
individualsxxix	  and	  as	   such	   lies	  closer	   to	   the	   interests	   that	  Collingwood	   is	  best	  known	   for.xxx	  
Conversely,	  passages	   such	  as	   the	   following	   from	  a	   letter	   sent	   to	  Ethel	  Collingwood	  shortly	  
after	  his	  arrival	  in	  Indonesia	  [31/11/38]	  could	  have	  easily	  been	  written	  by	  Wittgenstein:	  
	  
	  
It	  is	  a	  very	  odd	  thing,	  this	  idea	  that	  one	  entire	  civilization	  should	  be	  so	  related	  to	  
another	  that	  any	  member	  of	  the	  first	  is	  given	  a	  title	  of	  nobility	  by	  any	  member	  of	  
the	  second.	  It	  doesn't	  mean	  that	  either	  understands	  the	  other,	  for	  they	  don't;	  nor	  
that	  the	  dominant	  people	  beat	  the	  natives	  at	  their	  own	  game	  and	  win	  their	  respect	  
that	  way,	  for	  that	  again	  doesn't	  happen;	  it	  does	  mean,	  however,	  that	  the	  natives	  
recognize	  the	  strangers	  as	  people	  whom	  they	  can	  see	  to	  be	  obeying	  a	  stern	  and	  
exacting	  law,	  living	  for	  an	  idea	  &	  not	  for	  a	  good	  time,	  living	  hard	  &	  not	  taking	  things	  
easy.	   And	   I	   don't	   think	   that	   this	   is	   true	   any	   longer.	   I	   don't	   think	   that	   people	  
hereabouts	  look	  up	  much	  to	  Europeans.xxxi	  
	  
In	  response	  to	  a	  letter	  from	  C.L.	  Stevenson,	  Wittgenstein	  writes	  'I'm	  sorry	  you	  must	  do	  a	  lot	  
of	  the	  history	  of	  philosophy	  for	  it	  will	  hardly	  help	  you	  to	  clear	  up	  your	  own	  muddles'.	  It	  would	  
be	  precipitous	  to	  dismiss	  this	  as	  preposterous	  without	  making	  a	  little	  effort	  to	  understand	  the	  
thought	  behind	  it.	  The	  pleasing	  irony	  is	  that	  part	  of	  the	  reason	  for	  Wittgenstein's	  doubts	  about	  
the	  history	  of	  philosophy	  being	  able	  to	  help	  with	  one's	  personal	  philosophical	  muddles	  is	  a	  
deep	  pessimism	  about	  our	  power	  to	  readily	  understand	  the	  thought	  of	  others.	  This	  difficulty	  
becomes	  particularly	  salient	  when	  we	  are	  trying	  to	  understand	  people	  who	  lived	  in	  the	  distant	  
past	  and	  spoke	  a	  different	  language,	  both	  literally	  and	  metaphorically:	  
	  
	  
Really	  to	  understand	  other	  peoples	  [sic]	  thoughts	  or	  to	  learn	  from	  their	  confusions	  is	  
enormously	   difficult,	   especially	   if	   they	   lived	   long	   ago	   and	   talked	   a	   philosophical	  
language	  which	  isn’t	  your	  own.	  The	  only	  thing	  to	  do	  is	  to	  tell	  yourself	  that	  you	  don’t	  
understand	  what	  exactly	  they	  were	  at.	  If	  you’ve	  ever	  had	  a	  real	  thought	  yourself	  you’ll	  
know	  that	  it	  is	  difficult	  for	  you	  to	  understand	  other	  peoples	  thoughts.	  	  I	  know	  that,	  as	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a	  professor	  of	  philosophy,	  you’ve	  got	  to	  profess	  to	  understand	  what	  everyone	  meant	  
when	  they	  said…But	  you	  aren’t	  a	  professor,	  and	  so	  just	  enjoy	  your	  freedom!xxxii	  
	  
In	  the	  arena	  of	  the	  history	  of	  ideas,	  we're	  all	  latecomers	  seated	  at	  the	  gods,	  with	  restricted	  
viewing;	  but	  at	  least	  we	  got	  in.	  Wittgenstein	  undoubtedly	  found	  the	  ideas	  on	  show	  –	  at	  least	  
as	  incarnated	  in	  our	  reception	  of	  them	  –	  too	  thoroughly	  muddled	  to	  be	  of	  use	  to	  anybody.	  The	  
letter	  to	  Stevenson	  reveals	  why	  he	  also	  took	  it	  to	  be	  an	  extremely	  hard	  and	  perhaps	  thankless	  
(though	  not	  altogether	  hopeless)	  task	  to	  attempt	  to	  re-­‐evaluate	  standard	  interpretations	  of	  
past	  texts.	  Indeed,	  he	  seems	  to	  have	  acquired	  many	  of	  these	  second-­‐hand,	  with	  the	  exegetical	  
disinterest	  of	  a	  first-­‐year	  undergraduate,	  a	  stance	  fortified	  by	  his	  curious	  apathy	  with	  regard	  
to	  whether	  other	  philosophers	  had	  previously	  entertained	  the	  same	  thoughts	  as	  he	  (1922:26	  
&1953:	  viii).xxxiii	  	  
Wittgenstein	   would	   have	   approved	   of	   Collingwood's	   pronouncement	   that	   '[e]very	  
piece	  of	  writing	  is	  primarily	  addressed	  by	  the	  writer	  to	  himself'	  (Collingwood	  1933/2008:209)	  
and	  that,	  as	  Bernard	  Williams	  has	  put	  it	  'you	  could	  not	  understand	  what	  was	  being	  said	  by	  an	  
author	   unless	   you	   understood	   […]	   the	   question	   that	   he	   was	   trying	   to	   answer	   (Williams	  
2006:344).	  While	  he	   liked	  to	  spot	  congenial	   features,	  Wittgenstein	  cared	   little	   for	  whether	  
what	  he	   saw	   in	   Plato,	  Spinoza,	  Hume,	  Schopenhauer,	   Freud,	  or	  whomever	   coincided	  with	  
what	   they	  had	   in	  mind;	  what	  mattered	  was	   that	   it	  was	   there	   to	  be	   found.xxxiv	  This	   is	  not	  a	  
celebration	  of	  the	  death	  of	  the	  author,	  but	  of	  the	  life	  of	  the	  reader.	  As	  such,	  it	  is	  immune	  from	  
Collingwood's	   chastising	   of	   the	   scissors-­‐and-­‐paste	   teacher	   whose	   '	   claim	   to	   know	   what	  
question	  the	  author	  is	  asking	  is	  a	  fraud	  which	  anyone	  could	  expose	  by	  asking	  for	  his	  evidence'	  
(1939/2013:71).xxxv	  	  
Another	  instructive	  anomaly	  is	  Wittgenstein's	  precise	  juxtaposition	  of	  the	  historical	  
with	  the	  personal.	  This	  is	  complicated	  by	  the	  a	  prima	  facie	  tension	  between	  his	  anti-­‐scepticism	  
about	   knowledge	   of	   other	   minds	   and	   his	   pessimism	   in	   private	   correspondence	   about	  
understanding	  (or	  being	  understood	  by)	  other	  people.xxxvi	  The	  contrast	  reveals	  that	  while	  it	  is	  
metaphysically	  possible	  to	  not	  only	  understand	  the	  thought	  of	  another	  person	  but	  to	  have	  the	  
very	  same	  thought	  as	  them,	  it	  is	  in	  practice	  almost	  impossible	  to	  do	  so.	  Hence	  Wittgenstein's	  
remark,	  in	  a	  later	  letter	  to	  Sraffa	  that	  'it’s	  impossible,	  or	  almost	  impossible,	  for	  certain	  people	  
to	  understand	  each	  other'	  because	  of	  the	  'differences	  of	  their	  whole	  lives'.xxxvii	  	  
The	  problem	  of	  understanding,	  we	  are	  reminded,	  is	  not	  limited	  to	  period	  and	  place	  
but	  permeates	  our	  daily	  lives;	  if	  the	  history	  of	  pop	  music	  from	  Dylan,	  Bowie,	  and	  Springsteen	  
to	   Beyoncé,	  Winehouse,	   and	   Lorde	   is	   anything	   to	   go	   by,	   some	   of	  our	  most	   prevalent	   life	  
differences	  stem	  from	  generation,	  racial,	  and	  gender	  gaps	   in	  chic,	  wage,	  and	  achievement.	  
Collingwood's	  thoughts	  on	  the	  first	  of	   these	  reveal	  a	  stance	  consonant	  with	  Wittgenstein's	  
appropriation	  of	  Nestor's	  line	  'the	  thing	  about	  progress	  is	  that	  it	  always	  seems	  greater	  than	  it	  
really	  is'	  (see	  Cahill	  2006):	  
	  
If	  a	  community	  of	  fish-­‐eaters	  had	  changed	  their	  method	  of	  catching	  fish	  from	  a	  less	  
to	  a	  more	  efficient	  one	  […]	  this	  would	  be	  called	  an	  example	  of	  progress.	  But	  from	  
whose	  point	  of	  view	  is	  it	  an	  improvement?	  […]	  the	  older	  generation	  will	  see	  no	  need	  
for	  the	  change	  knowing	  as	  it	  does	  that	  life	  can	  be	  lived	  on	  the	  old	  method.	  And	  it	  
will	  also	  think	  that	  the	  old	  method	  is	  better	  than	  the	  new;	  not	  because	  of	  irrational	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prejudice,	  but	  because	  the	  way	  of	  life	  which	  it	  knows	  and	  values	  is	  built	  round	  the	  
old	  method	  […]	  To	  him,	  therefore,	  the	  change	  is	  no	  progress	  but	  a	  decadence	  (IoH	  
325).	  
	  
The	  thought	  that	  bridging	  such	  life-­‐gaps	  is	  almost	  –	  but	  not	  quite	  –	  impossible	  is	  testimony	  to	  
Wittgenstein's	  thinking	  that	  the	  difficulty	  here	  is	  not	  metaphysical	  but	  psychological.	  Indeed,	  
as	   early	   as	   the	  Tractatus,	   he	   sees	   no	   difficulty	   in	   the	   idea	   of	   having	   or	   thinking	   the	   same	  
thought	  as	  another:	  
	  
Dieses	  Buch	  wird	  vielleicht	  nur	  der	  verstehen,	  der	  die	  Gedanken,	  die	  darin	  ausgedrücht	  
sind	  –	  oder	  doch	  ähnliche	  Gedanken	  –	  schon	  selbst	  einmal	  gedacht	  hat.xxxviii	  
	  
If	  the	  qualification	  of	  'similar	  thoughts'	  marks	  any	  kind	  of	  hesitation	  at	  all	  it	  is	  of	  a	  psychological	  
(not	  philosophical)	  nature.	  Indeed,	  Wittgenstein	  has	  such	  a	  high	  standard	  for	  thought	  that	  he	  
finds	  it	  is	  hard	  for	  writing	  to	  express	  thoughts	  at	  all	  (1922:28),	  let	  alone	  ones	  that	  have	  not	  
already	  been	  anticipated	  in	  some	  way.	  It	  is	  highly	  improbable,	  in	  this	  view,	  for	  one	  person	  to	  
fully	  understand	  the	  thought	  of	  another.	  Nonetheless	  it	  remains	  possible	  precisely	  because	  
two	  people	  can	  share	  the	  same	  thought.	  Wittgenstein	  presents	  us	  with	  no	  theory	  here	  but	  it	  
is	  clear	   that	   they	  need	  to	  have	  much	  else	   in	   their	   lives	   in	  common	  for	   this	   to	  be	  the	  case.	  
Whereas	   Collingwood	   emphasizes	   the	   reasoning	   that	   led	   to	   the	   thought	   in	   question,	  
Wittgenstein	  highlights	  the	  importance	  of	  shared	  forms	  of	  life.	  
	   In	  his	  book	  Historical	  Explanation:	  Re-­‐enactment	  and	  Practical	  Inference,	  Rex	  Martin	  
compares	  what	  he	  presents	  as	  Wittgenstein's	  idea	  that	  the	  'content'	  of	  practice	  founded	  on	  
game-­‐forms	   can	   be	   neither	   true	   or	   false	   to	   Collingwood's	   doctrine	   of	   absolute	  
presuppositions. xxxix 	  His	   aim	   is	   to	   show	   how	   'action	   explanations	   constitute	   a	   practice,	   a	  
language-­‐game'	  (Martin	  1077:203),	  thereby	  integrating	  his	  modified	  version	  of	  Collingwood's	  
account	  of	  re-­‐enactment	  as	  the	  reconstruction	  of	  practical	  reasoning	  with	  G.H.	  von	  Wright's	  
theory	  of	  practical	  inference.xl	  	  




Von	  Wright	  has	  provided	  no	  real	  role	  for	  understanding	  in	  his	  account	  of	  the	  logic	  of	  
action	  explanations	  […]	  has	  failed	  to	  integrate	  understanding	  into	  his	  account	  of	  the	  
teleological	  explanations	  of	  actions.xli	  	  
	  
He	   subsequently	   argues	   that	   while	   von	   Wright	   provides	   a	   corrective	   to	   Collingwood's	  
distorted	  role	  of	  understanding	  by	  showing	  that	  'an	  action-­‐explanation	  derives	  its	  force	  not	  
just	  from	  facts	  in	  perspicuous	  connection	  but	  from	  these	  facts	  when	  placed	  within	  their	  proper	  
framework,	   the	   framework	   provided	   by	   the	   basic	   schema' xlii ,	   and	   that	   we	   can	   view	   re-­‐
enactment	  as	  'the	  way	  of	  establishing	  facts	  that	  will	  satisfy	  the	  conditions	  of	  the	  schema	  for	  
action-­‐explanation'	  by	  showing	  'that	  these	  particular	  facts	  do	  "fit	  together"''xliii.	  It	  is	  here	  that	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Wittgenstein	  comes	  to	  the	  rescue,	  by	  providing	  the	  schema	  which	  lies	  at	  the	  foundation	  of	  
the	  language	  game	  or	  practice.xliv	  	  
	   Exegetical	  quibbles	  aside,	  what	   is	  striking	  about	  Martin's	  approach	   is	   that	   the	  next	  
chapter	   of	   the	   same	   book,	   'Other	   Periods,	   Other	   Cultures',	   explicitly	   compares	   historical	  
explanations	   to	   cultural	   ones	   without	   mention	   of	   Wittgenstein's	   numerous	   remarks	   on	  
understanding	  others.	  A	  possible	  explanation	  of	  this	  oddity	  is	  the	  unhelpful	  Wittgensteinian	  
fixation	  on	  language	  games	  and	  practices.	  But	  Wittgenstein's	  oeuvre	  is	  not	  only	  far	  richer	  than	  
the	  picture	  resulting	  from	  this	  malady	  would	  seem	  to	  allow,	  it	  also	  chimes	  much	  better	  with	  
the	  thought	  of	  Collingwood.	  	  
	   Martin	   defines	   understanding	   as	   'the	   ability,	   given	   a	   particular	   set	   of	   facts,	   to	  
construct	  an	  unforced	  narrative'.xlv	  This	  to	  be	  contrasted	  with	  the	  psychological	  construal	  of	  
understanding	  as	  an	  experience	  of	  some	  kind	  (e.g.	  of	  having	  'got	  it').	  To	  understand	  another,	  
on	  this	  view,	  is	  to	  be	  able	  to	  render	  their	  words	  and	  deeds	  intelligible	  via	  a	  narrative	  that	  lends	  
itself	  naturally	  to	  the	  given	  facts,	  as	  opposed	  to	  one	  which	  is	  forced	  upon	  them	  like	  some	  ill-­‐
fitting	  puzzle	  piece	  that	  ostensibly	  completes	  the	  sky.	  The	  ability	  need	  not	  be	  exercised,	  of	  
course.	  We	  might	  immediately	  see	  the	  meaningfulness	  in	  another's	  conduct;	  but	  the	  criteria	  
for	  judging	  whether	  we	  in	  fact	  do	  so	  is	  tied	  to	  one's	  being	  able	  to	  explain	  it	  to	  another.	  	  	  
In	   the	   case	   of	   distant	   periods	   and	   cultures,	   nothing	   is	   immediate,	   at	   least	   not	  
conclusively	  so.	  Here	  is	  how	  Isaiah	  Berlin	  characterizes	  a	  typical	  challenge:	  
	  
	  
We	  must	  therefore	  ask	  ourselves	  what	  the	  world	  must	  have	  been	  like	  for	  those	  to	  
whom	   such	   use	   of	   language,	   which	   is	   almost	   meaningless	   to	   us,	   made	   sense	  
[…]Transpose	  ourselves	  […]	  only	  with	  the	  most	  agonising	  effort	  that	  we	  can	  even	  
attempt	   to	  enter	   the	  mentality	   	   into	  another	  world	   […]	   to	  our	   remote	  ancestors	  
ploughs	   actually	   appeared	   to	   have	   teeth;	   rivers,	   which	   for	   them	   were	   semi-­‐
animate,	   had	   mouths:	   land	   was	   endowed	   with	   necks	   and	   tongues,	   metals	   and	  
minerals	   with	   veins,	   the	   earth	   had	   bowels,	   oaks	   had	   hearts,	   skies	   smiled	   and	  
frowned,	  winds	  raged,	  the	  whole	  of	  nature	  was	  alive	  and	  active	  (Berlin	  1974:	  344-­‐
5).xlvi	  
	  
Martin	  argues	  persuasively	  that	  the	  problem	  of	  other	  periods	  (viz.	  how	  to	  understand	  the	  past	  
from	  the	  radically	  dissimilar	  perspective	  of	  the	  present)	  is	  structurally	  identical	  to	  the	  problem	  
of	  other	  cultures	  (viz.	  how	  to	  understand	  another	  culture	  given	  ethnocentric	  distortion).xlvii	  
The	  possibility	  of	  history	  thereby	  hinges	  on	  the	  same	  kind	  of	  transcendental	  abilities	  as	  the	  
possibility	  of	  anthropology.	  Martin	  contends	  that	  Collingwood's	   idea	  of	  a	   'changing	  human	  
nature'	  that	  'conceived	  of	  a	  set	  of	  thoughts	  and	  actions	  common	  to	  men	  at	  one	  time	  turning	  
into	  a	  wholly	  different	  set	  for	  other	  men	  at	  a	  later	  time'	  (1977:216)	  rules	  out	  transhistorical	  
generalizations	  from	  the	  outset.	  This	  is	  a	  mistake,	  in	  his	  view,	  because	  we	  can	  only	  come	  to	  
understand	   others	   by	   appeal	   to	   schema	   of	   practical	   inference	   that	   have	   transhistorical	  
application.xlviii	  
It	   is	   precisely	   here	   that	  Wittgenstein	   can	   come	   to	  Collingwood's	   rescue.	  What	   the	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social	  understanding	  requires	  is	  not	  the	  Winchian	  application	  of	  any	  kinds	  of	  rules	  of	  inference	  
which	  'favour	  a	  static	  picture	  of	  a	  fully	  functioning	  and	  coherent	  system'	  (Williams	  2006:	  357)	  
but	  an	  immersion	  into	  their	  form	  of	  life.	  In	  the	  case	  of	  other	  periods	  this	  can	  only	  be	  simulated	  
through	  re-­‐enactment.	  It	  is	  a	  false	  dilemma	  to	  think	  that	  understanding	  a	  radically	  different	  
person	  or	  culture	  must	  be	  either	  completely	   impossible	  or	  a	  mere	  matter	  of	   locating	  some	  
norms	  and	  making	  the	  relevant	  inferences.	  Understanding	  is	  a	  matter	  of	  degree	  and	  can	  be	  
difficult	  to	  properly	  attain	  even	  with	  those	  closest	  to	  one,	  not	  to	  mention	  one's	  own	  self.	  But	  
it	  is	  in	  principle	  always	  possible	  to	  share	  a	  way	  of	  living	  with	  another	  and	  thereby	  also	  come	  
to	  share	  their	  thoughts.	  	  
	   Wittgenstein	  uses	  'forms	  of	  life'	  to	  refer	  to	  regular	  forms	  of	  living	  (Hacker	  2015:	  §	  3),	  
but	  one	  finds	  no	  difficulty	  in	  extending	  the	  concept	  to	  cover	  a	  particular	  individual’s	  unique	  
way	  of	  living.	  So	  understood,	  a	  form	  of	  life	  need	  not	  be	  an	  entire	  community’s	  way	  of	  living,	  
but	  simply	  that	  of	  an	  individual.	  If	  'to	  imagine	  a	  language	  is	  to	  imagine	  a	  form	  of	  life'	  (PI	  §§19),	  
might	  this	  not	  also	  apply	  to	  the	  language	  of	  a	  particular	  person?	  This	  would	  not	  be	  a	  private	  
language	  in	  Wittgenstein’s	  principled	  sense,	  but	  the	  distinct	  language	  of	  a	  particular	  person	  
nonetheless.
	  	  
The	  alternate	  understanding	  of	  Wittgenstein’s	  forms	  of	  life	  as	  'part	  of	  our	  inflexible	  
biological	  human	  nature'xlix
	  
is	  implausible,	  both	  as	  an	  interpretation	  of	  Wittgenstein	  and	  as	  a	  
philosophical	  view	  in	  its	  own	  right.	  This	  is	  not	  to	  say	  that	  biological	  differences	  cannot	  underlie	  
or	  enable	  cultural	  ones,	  just	  that	  the	  everyday	  difficulty	  of	  understanding	  others	  is	  not	  based	  
on	  biology.	  The	  dilemma	  between	  a	  difference	  in	  forms	  of	  life	  that	  is	  purely	  biological	  and	  one	  
that	   is	  merely	   cultural	   is	   a	   false	   one.	   The	   criteria	   for	   understanding	   others	   are	   ultimately	  
behavioural	  and	  this	  includes	  both	  natural	  and	  nurtured	  conduct:	  	  	  
	  
	  
[...]	   he	   [the	   explorer	   in	   the	   foreign	   land]	   can	   come	   to	   understand	   it	   [the	   foreign	  
language]	  only	  through	  its	  connections	  with	  the	  rest	  of	  the	  life	  of	  the	  natives.	  What	  we	  
call	  ‘instructions’,	  for	  example,	  or	  ‘orders’,	  ‘questions’,	  ‘answers’,	  ‘describing’,	  etc.	  is	  
all	  bound	  up	  with	  very	  specific	  human	  actions	  and	  an	  order	  is	  only	  distinguishable	  as	  
an	  order	  by	  means	  of	  the	  circumstances	  preceding	  or	  following	  //	  accompanying	  it	  //.l	  	  
	  
Suppose	   you	   came	   as	   an	   explorer	   to	   an	   unknown	   country	   with	   a	   language	   quite	  
unknown	   to	   you.	   In	  what	   circumstances	  would	   you	   say	   that	   the	  people	   there	   gave	  
orders,	   understood	   them,	   obeyed	   them,	   rebelled	   against	   them,	   and	   so	   on?	   Shared	  
human	  behaviour	   [Die	   gemeinsame	  menschliche	  Handlungsweise]li
	  
is	   the	   system	  of	  
reference	  by	  means	  of	  which	  we	  interpret	  an	  unknown	  language.lii	  	  
	  
Moreover,	  as	  Glock,	  and	  Baker	  and	  Hacker	  point	  out,	  even	  the	  cultural-­‐specific	  is	  ultimately	  
rooted	  in	  biology:	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[...]	  understanding	  an	  alien	  language	  presupposes	  convergence	  not	  of	  beliefs,	  but	  of	  
patterns	  of	  behaviour,	  which	  presuppose	  common	  perceptual	  capacities,	  needs	  and	  
emotions	  [...]	  we	  “could	  not	  find	  our	  feet”	  with	  a	  community	  of	  human	  beings	  who	  
give	  no	  expression	  or	  feeling	  of	  any	  kind,	  and	  we	  would	  presumably	  be	  at	  a	  loss	  with	  
spherical	  Martians.liii	  	  	  
	  
Shared	  human	  behaviour	  provides	  the	  essential	  leverage	  for	  understanding	  mankind.	  
This	   “shared	   behaviour”	   is	   not	   only	   the	   common	   behaviour	   of	   mankind	   which	  
manifests	  our	  animal	  nature,	  our	  natural	  needs	   for	   food,	  drink,	  warmth,	  our	   sexual	  
drives,	  our	  physical	  vulnerability,	  etc.	   It	  also	   includes	  the	  culturally	  specific	  forms	  of	  
behaviour	  shared	  by	  members	  of	  the	  tribe	  –	  their	  specific	  forms	  of	  social	  behaviour	  –	  
observation	  of	  which	  and	  interaction	  with	  which	  enables	  us	  to	  interpret	  their	  language	  
[...]	  any	  “form	  of	  life”	  accessible	  to	  lions,	  given	  their	  natural	  repertoire	  of	  behaviour	  
and	  their	  behavioural	  dispositions,	  is	  too	  far	  removed	  from	  ours	  for	  any	  noises	  they	  




We	  need	  not	  worry	  then,	  as	  Martin	  does,	  whether	  or	  not	  human	  nature	   is	  constant.	  What	  
matters	   is	   that	  Wittgenstein	   shares	   Collingwood's	   thought	   that	   the	   actions	   of	   individuals	  
should	  be	  understood	  against	   a	   background	  of	   shared	  assumptions	   that	  may	  be	   culturally	  
specific.	  In	  this	  respect,	  it	  is	  a	  moot	  point	  whether	  or	  not	  Wittgenstein	  would	  ultimately	  reject	  
Collingwood's	   historical	   metaphysics,	   for	   even	   Strawson's	   substitute	   account	   of	   core	  
(transhistorical)	  concepts	  is	  in	  keep	  with	  contextualist	  anthropology.lv	  Indeed,	  we	  could	  even	  
acquire	  the	  elusive	  ability	  to	  understand	  a	  speaking	  lion	  if	  we	  successfully	  immersed	  ourselves	  






It	   is	   common	   and	   not	   entirely	   mistaken	   to	   think	   of	   Collingwood	   as	   a	   metaphysician	   and	  
Wittgenstein	  as	  the	  anti-­‐metaphysician	  par	  excellence.	  The	  followers	  of	  the	  latter	  would	  form	  
a	  crucial	  part	  of	  the	  ordinary	  language	  backlash	  to	  the	  British	  idealist	  movement,	  whose	  tail	  
end	  they	  associated	  Collingwood	  with.	  Given	  all	  this,	  it	  is	  pretty	  remarkable	  that	  Collingwood	  
and	  Wittgenstein	  developed	  strikingly	  similar	  views	  on	  what	  it	  takes	  to	  understand	  another	  
person	  independently	  of	  one	  another	  during	  the	  same	  period	  of	  years.	  	  
	   While	  they	  go	  about	  this	  in	  strikingly	  different	  ways,	  this	  is	  not	  a	  case	  of	  reaching	  the	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same	   conclusion	   through	   different,	   let	   alone	   incompatible,	   routes.	   Far	   from	   it,	   the	   two	  
philosophers	  reason	  in	  similar	  ways	  when	  considering	  the	  relation	  of	  thought	  to	  action,	  and	  
of	  both	  to	  explanation	  and	  understanding.	  
	   I	  began	  this	  essay	  by	  highlighting	  a	  number	  of	  contrasts	  in	  focus	  between	  Collingwood	  
and	   Wittgenstein.	   These	   were	   (i)	   period	   vs.	   place,	   (ii)	   individual	   vs.	   collective,	   (iii)	   re-­‐
enactment	  vs.	  forms	  of	  life.	  It	  turned	  out	  that	  not	  only	  were	  these	  superficial	  differences	  of	  
emphasis,	  but	  that	  Wittgenstein's	  philosophical	  anthropology	  provides	  the	  glue	  which	  makes	  
Collingwood's	  anti-­‐transhistoricism	  stick.lvii	  	  
	  
	  
	   	  
	  
Constantine	  Sandis	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  Pears	  
&	  B.F.	  McGuiness	  (London:	  Routledge).	  	  
_________	   (1953/2009),	  Philosophical	   Investigations	   (PI),	   4th	  edition,	   tr.	  G.E.M.	  Anscombe,	  
P.M.S.	  Hacker,	  &	  J.	  Schulte	  (Oxford:	  Wiley-­‐Blackwell).	  	  
_______	  (1959)	  On	  Certainty,	  trns.	  G.E.M.	  Anscombe	  (Oxford:	  Blackwell).	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_________	  (1993),	   ‘Remarks	  on	  Frazer’s	  Golden	  Bough’,	   in	  (eds.)	  J.	  Klagge	  &	  A.	  Nordmann,	  
Philosophical	  Occasions	  1912–1951	  (Indianapolis	  and	  Cambridge:	  Hackett),	  pp.	  115–55.	  	  
	  
i	  Wittgenstein's	  Preface	  to	  Philosophical	   Investigations	  (PI)	   is	  dated	  January	  1945;	  Collingwood's	  The	  
Idea	  of	  History	  (IoH)	  was	  originally	  published	  in	  1946.	  Both	  had	  been	  working	  on	  these	  uncompleted	  
(posthumously	  published)	  masterpieces	  for	  years	  and	  would	  continue	  to	  develop	  their	  ideas	  until	  their	  
early	  deaths.	  For	  literature	  on	  various	  resemblances	  between	  the	  two	  philosophers	  see	  Boucher	  (1995:	  
n.	  42).	  
ii 	  James	   Connelly	   (2013:413-­‐4)	   notes	   that	   the	   doctrine	   may	   have	   been	   influenced	   by	   Witchcraft,	  
Oracles,	  and	  Magic	  Among	  the	  Azande,	  which	  Collingwood	  read	  in	  manuscript	  form	  for	  the	  university	  
press;	  for	  comparisons	  between	  Evans-­‐Prichard	  and	  Wittgenstein	  see	  Winch	  (1964:22ff.);	  cf	  MacIntyre	  
(1962	  &	  1964).	  
iii	  Bernard	  Williams(2006:355ff.)	  contends	  that	  'absolute	  presuppositions	  structure	  practices'	  and	  that	  
'Collingwood	   should	   have	   acknowledge	   more	   than	   he	   did	   in	   this	   connection	   what	   in	   relation	   to	  
Wittgenstein	   is	   called	   the	   primacy	   of	   practice'.	   In	   his	   Remarks	   on	   Frazer’s	   Golden	   Bough,	   'our'	  
presuppositions	  are	  claimed	  to	  be	  no	  better	  (or	  worse)	  than	  those	  of	  allegedly	  primitive	  people	  who	  
'only	   possess	   a	   peculiar	   interpretation	   of	   the	   phenomena’	   (Wittgenstein	   1993:141).	   This	   approach	  
culminates	  in	  the	  'hinge	  proposition'	  remarks	  On	  Certainty	  (e.g.	  §§	  341,	  343,	  &	  655)	  that	  are	  arguably	  
not	  propositions	  at	  all	  but	  akin	   to	  heuristic	  maxims	   for	   interpreting	  phenomena.	  As	  Danièle	  Moyal-­‐
Sharrock	   argues,	   these	   ‘hinge	   certainties’	   are	  not	   inferred	   from	   experience	   and	   do	  not	   function	   as	  
grounds,	   but	   rather	   as	   the	   ‘scaffolding	   of	   our	   language	   games’	   (Moyal-­‐Sharrock,	   2005:80-­‐2;	   cf.	  
Hamilton,	  2014:104ff).	  
iv	  For	  the	  last	  of	  these	  see	  Collingwood	  (2005),	  as	  well	  as	  his	  'Log	  of	  a	  Journey	  in	  the	  East	  Indies	  in	  1938-­‐
9'	   (Collingwood	   1939/2013:	   Part	   II);	   see	   also	   Connelly	   (2009).	   As	   the	   editors	   of	   The	   Philosophy	   of	  
Enchantment	  point	  out,	  'some	  of	  the	  points	  made	  by	  Collingwood	  in	  his	  critique	  of	  early	  anthropology	  
are	   mirrored	   in	  Wittgenstein’s	   almost	   contemporary	   notes	   made	   on	   the	   Golden	   Bough,	   also	   little	  
known	  and	  most	  fully	  published	  only	  in	  1993'	  (Collingwood	  2005:lxvi).	  
v	  I	  consider	  Winch's	  somewhat	  uncharitable	  interpretation	  of	  Collingwood	  in	  Sandis	  (2015b:	  379-­‐800).	  
vi	  IoH	  (216–7).	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vii	  Ibid	  (283).	   	  
viii	  Ibid;	  see	  also	  Collingwood	  (1939:	  53–76).	  
ix	  IoH	  (300).	  In	  Sandis	  (2011)	  I	  try	  to	  show	  that	  Collingwood	  here	  strikes	  a	  balance	  between	  empathy	  
and	  detachment.	  
x	  IoH	  (301).	  	  
xi	  For	   the	   type/token	   distinction	   in	   Collingwood	   See	   D’Oro	   (2000),	   Saari	   (1989),	   &	   Van	   der	   Dussen	  
(1995).	  
xii	  Borges	  (1939).	  
xiii	  IoH	  (300–301).	  	  
xiv	  PI	  (§§	  253–254). 	  
xv	  Hacker	  (1990:21). 	  
xvi	  Collingwood	  (2005:18).	  
xvii	  (Collingwood	  1938:250).	  
xviii	  Collingwood	  (1942/1992:	  41).	  
xix	  Collingwood	  (1938:	  Ch.8);	  see	  Asad	  (2012:49)	  for	  complications	  relating	  to	  emotion.	  
xx	  For	  the	  locus	  classicus	  of	  this	  distinction	  see	  White	  (1972).	  
xxi	  IoH	  (215).	  	  
xxii	  Ibid(213–4).	  	  
xxiii	  See	   Sandis	   (2011:12-­‐15).	  For	   parallels	   between	  Hegelian	   and	  Wittgensteinian	   approaches	   to	   the	  
philosophy	  of	  action	  see	  Taylor	  (1979	  &2010)	  and	  Laitinen	  &	  Sandis	  (2010ab:6–7).	  
xxiv	  Dray	  (1980:	  12).	  In	  similar	  spirit,	  Giuseppina	  D’Oro	  (2003)	  argues	  that	  Collingwood’s	  philosophy	  of	  
mind	  offers	  a	  viable	  account	  of	  the	  irreducibility	  of	  the	  mental	  which	  has	  been	  mistakenly	  regarded	  as	  
one	  of	  Ryle's	  targets;	  see	  Collingwood's(1933/2008:253-­‐326)	  for	  his	  correspondence	  with	  Ryle.	  	  
Anscombe	  (1963:83,	  §	  46).	   	  
xxvi	  For	  Collingwood's	  place	  in	  the	  history	  of	  the	  reasons/causes	  debate,	  see	  Sandis	  (2006	  &	  2015b)	  and	  
D'Oro	  &	  Sandis	  (2013).	  
xxvii	  IoH	  (214–5).	  For	  his	  alternative	  way	  of	  capturing	  the	  nature	  of	  action	  explanation	  which	  does	  not	  
resort	  to	  the	  inside/outside	  metaphor	  see	  Collingwood	  (1940/1998:	  285–89).	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xxviii	  It	   is	  even	  closer	  and,	  along	  with	  Wittgenstein,	  served	  as	  a	   forerunner	   to	   the	  kind	  of	  descriptive	  
metaphysics	  that	  Strawson	  (1959)	  would	  pioneer	  in	  the	  aftermath	  of	  Wittgenstein's	  heyday.	  The	  largest	  
difference	  between	  them	  is	  that	  the	  latter	  replaces	  historical	  metaphysics	  with	  'a	  massive	  central	  core	  
of	   human	   thinking'	   which,	   unlike	   Collingwood's	   absolute	   presuppositions,	   'has	   no	   history'	   because	  
'there	  are	  categories	  and	  concepts	  which,	  in	  their	  most	  fundamental	  character,	  change	  not	  at	  all'	  (ibid.:	  
10);	  see	  also	  Hacker	  (1996:176).	  
xxix	  I	  explore	  this	  contrast	  in	  Sandis	  (2015a).	  
xxx	  But	  see	  note	  iv	  above.	  
xxxi	  Underlying	  in	  the	  original,	  as	  quoted	  by	  James	  (2013:522).	  
xxxii	  Wittgenstein	  to	  C.L.	  Stevenson,	  22.12.1933;	  in	  McGuiness	  (2012,	  §165,	  p.218).	  
xxxiii	  For	  a	  deeper	  exploration	  of	  Wittgenstein's	  ambivalent	   relation	   to	   the	  history	  of	  philosophy,	   see	  
Glock	  (2005).	  
xxxiv	  Von	  Wright	  (1955:543-­‐4)	  writes	  that	  '[f]rom	  Spinoza,	  Hume,	  and	  Kant	  he	  said	  that	  he	  could	  get	  only	  
occasional	  glimpses	  of	  understanding'	  whereas	  'he	  did	  read	  and	  enjoy	  Plato'.	  
xxxv	  The	  passage	  also	  includes	  an	  incidental	  mention	  of	  Wittgenstein,	  in	  the	  same	  breath	  as	  Plato	  and	  
Kant.	  
xxxvi	  See	  Sandis	  (2012	  &	  2015b)	  for	  how	  his	  cryptic	  remark	  about	  the	  speaking	  lion	  may	  serve	  as	  a	  point	  
of	  contact	  between	  the	  two	  domains.	  
xxxvii	  Wittgenstein	  to	  P.	  Sraffa,	  23.8.1949;	  in	  McGuiness	  (2012:	  §410,	  p.450).	  
xxxviii	  Wittgenstein	   (1922:26).	  Ogden	   translates	   this	  as	   'This	  book	  will	  perhaps	  only	  be	  understood	  by	  
those	   who	   have	   themselves	   already	   thought	   the	   thoughts	   which	   are	   expressed	   in	   it	   –	   or	   similar	  
thoughts'	  (1922:27);	  Pears	  &	  McGuiness	  as	  'Perhaps	  this	  book	  will	  be	  understood	  only	  by	  someone	  who	  
has	  himself	  already	  had	  the	  thoughts	  that	  are	  expressed	  in	  it	  –	  or	  at	  least	  similar	  thoughts'	  (1974:3).	  
xxxix	  Martin	  (1977:	  209-­‐10);	  Collingwood	  (1940/1998:	  Part	  I).	  
xl	  For	  a	  sympathetic	  yet	  pertinent	  critique	  of	  von	  Wright's	  account	  see	  Anscombe	  (1974).	  
xli	  Martin	  (1977:	  94).	  
xlii	  Ibid	  (95),	  emphasis	  in	  original.	  
xliii	  Ibid	  (96).	  
xliv	  Martin	  equates	  the	  two	  but	  this	  infelicity	  need	  not	  concern	  us	  here.	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xlv	  Martin	  (1977:94).	  
xlvi	  A	  book-­‐length	  treatment	  of	  a	  cultural	  example	  akin	  to	  Berlin's	  historical	  one	  may	  be	  found	  in	  Lear	  
(2006).	  One	  difference	  between	  Berlin	  and	  Collingwood	  is	  that	  the	  former	  places	  a	  greater	  emphasis	  
on	  the	  notion	  of	  empathy;	  for	  Collingwood's	  influence	  on	  Berlin	  see	  Bevir	  and	  Choi	  (2015:334-­‐56).	  
xlvii	  Ibid	  (217);	  see	  also	  Danto	  (1965:	  &	  201-­‐56	  &	  1966)	  and	  Martin	  &	  Hanson	  (1973).	  Danto	  distinguishes	  
between	  the	  explanatory	  need	  of	  general	   laws	  and	  that	  of	  narratives.	  In	  his	  book,	  he	  only	  mentions	  
Collingwood	  once,	  alongside,	  Croce	  and	  Dilthey,	  all	  identified	  as	  'Historical	  Idealists	  […]	  unanimous	  in	  
insisting	  upon	  a	  radical	  distinction	  between	  the	  behaviour	  of	  human	  beings	  and	  non-­‐human	  entities,	  
and	   a	   corresponding	   radical	   distinction	   between	   the	   groups	   of	   disciplines	  which	   respectively	   study	  
these	  two	  allegedly	  distinct	  kinds	  of	  behaviour'	  (1965:205).	  Notwithstanding	  the	  complicated	  exception	  
of	  animal	  thought	  (see	  Sandis	  2012),	  this	  puts	  Wittgenstein	  in	  the	  very	  same	  'radical'	  boat.	  	  
xlviii	  In	   his	   later	  work	  Martin	  writes	   that	   '[t]he	   place	   to	   look	   in	   order	   to	   find	  models	   or	   sympathetic	  
examples	  of	  Collingwood's	  idea	  that	  basic	  presuppositions	  couldn't	  be	  verified	  would	  be	  […]	  not	  logical	  
positivism	   […]	   but	   rather	   strong	   critics	   of	   that	   doctrine,	   like	  Wittgenstein	   or	   Quine	   (2013:259);	   for	  
Collingwood's	  response	  to	  logical	  positivism	  see	  Williams	  (2006:	  353-­‐4).	  
xlix	  The	  phrase	  -­‐	  but	  not	  the	  view	  –	  belongs	  to	  Glock	  (1996:	  124-­‐5).	  
l	  Wittgenstein	  [MS	  165,	  pp.	  97ff.];	  as	  quoted	  in	  Baker	  and	  Hacker	  (1985:191	  &	  2009:177).	  
li	  See	  Hintikka	  &	  Hintikka	  (1986:	  209),	  von	  Savigny	  (1991:113–14),	  and  Ma  &  van  Brakel	  (2016:	  Chp.	  6)	  
why	   Anscombe’s	   rendition	   of	   this	   phrase	   as	   'the	   common	   behaviour	   of	   mankind'	   is	   deeply	  
problematic. 	  	  
lii	  PI	  (§	  206).	  
liii	  Glock	  (1996:	  128).	  
liv	  Baker	  and	  Hacker	  (2009:173,	   inc.	  n.	  1;	  see	  also	  218ff.)	   In	  this	  revised	  version	  of	  Baker	  and	  Hacker	  
(1985:186–187),	   'shared	   behavior'	   substitutes	  what	  was	   previously	   'common	  behavior'	   throughout.	  
This	  is	  because	  the	  common	  behaviour	  of	  humanity	  does	  not	  completely	  exhaust	  our	  shared	  behaviour,	  
which	  also	   includes	  behaviour	   that	   is	   'culturally	   specific'	   (this	   last	   term	  helpfully	   replaces	  what	  was	  
previously	  characterised	  as	  'the	  diverse	  species-­‐specific	  forms	  which	  such	  behaviour	  may	  naturally	  take	  
for	  human	  beings').	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lv	  See	  note	  xxix,	  above.	  Both	  the	  Humean	  and	  the	  Kantian	  strands	  of	  Strawson's	  approach	  to	  concepts	  
may	  be	  at	  odds	  with	  Collingwood's	  wholesale	  rejection	  of	  the	  uniformity	  of	  human	  nature,	  but	  neither	  
of	  them	  undermine	  the	  explanatory	  importance	  of	  shared	  particulars.	  In	  his	  review	  of	  William	  Dray's	  
Laws	  and	  Explanation	  in	  History,	  Strawson	  accordingly	  argues	  that	  while	  some	  'general	  knowledge	  of	  
human	  nature'	  is	  relevant	  to	  historical	  explanation,	  there	  are	  no	  covering-­‐laws	  of	  human	  behaviour	  for	  
it	   to	   appeal	   to	   (Strawson	   1959b:266);	   he	   also	   chastises	   Dray	   for	   (apparently)	   failing	   to	   distinguish	  
between	   'reconstructing	  a	   calculation	  and	  endorsing	   it	   as	   a	   correct	   calculation'	   (ibid:	  267;	   see	  Dray	  
1963:72	  &83	  for	  his	  response).	  
lvi	  Sandis	  (2012:151-­‐2).	  
lvii	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